Introduction:
Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization

Introduction

It is close to midnight on a warm and muggy monsoon evening in the middle of August 2003. Gupta navigates the potholed streets leading from South Delhi to Gurgaon, crossing a border checkpoint along the way. Once in Gurgaon, Gupta heads off from the main street and pulls up in front of a building that looks like a large house. This is the hottest new development in the landscape of post-reform urban India: a call center. The owner, just barely old enough to be out of high school, proudly gives Gupta a tour of the building.

The ground floor consists of executive offices and other facilities. The next level is “the floor,” the space where hundreds of college-age men and women are sitting on low booths arranged in an open-plan office. The space is brightly lit, and it is fairly throbbing with energy. One can feel the adrenalin pumping in this large room; there is a “buzz” that one associates with a newsroom on deadline or a project team whose product is due the following morning. The owner explains that they deliberately do not mute sounds because the high energy level prevents the operators from feeling drowsy through their shifts, which last all or most of the night.

Gupta is encouraged by the floor manager to listen in to one of the conversations. A young man is persuading a customer to refinance his mortgage in an accent that is a mix of Midwestern American and Haryanvi Hindi. The script that he is supposed to use flashes across the screen in front of him but he
does not need to look at it. It is clear that he has already committed the script to memory. The floor manager, a woman in her early thirties, a veteran of the industry, goes around checking how many calls each of the operators have managed in the last few minutes. She tells a new employee that she expects her to complete a certain number of calls before taking a break.

As a symbol of economic globalization, call centers have come to occupy a central place in debates on the “outsourcing” of jobs from the North. Corporations, and increasingly state bureaucracies in the North, are farming out customer service and processing-related jobs to the South as part of their cost-cutting measures. Countries like India, with a significant English-speaking population and comparatively low labor costs, are prime destinations for job outsourcing. It is not only national governments in the South that are soliciting these contracts as part of their liberalization efforts. City and state governments are also independently seeking out outsourced businesses, like call centers, as an important entrepreneurial-based development strategy.

Call centers differ from each other in terms of size, function, ownership, and client profile. There are numerous small, family-owned enterprises like the one Gupta visited; however, the ones that get the most media attention are the huge call centers operated by enterprises like GE Capital, which employed more than 2000 people in Gurgaon in 2002 (Online Asia Times, August 7, 2002; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DH07Df01.html). Apart from being family owned, the call center Gupta visited was an “independent” one that served multiple clients rather than what is called a “captive” center operated by the Indian subsidiary of a large transnational corporation. Not all independents are family owned or small enterprises; many are large corporations in their own right or subsidiaries of giant software companies like Wipro. The “captive” centers are set up to provide services to the employees and customers of only one corporation. From “captive” centers, it is a short step to the criticism that the entire industry represents a new form of indenture in the global division of labor, the “cyber-coolie” (Bidwai 2003: 32).1

Centers are distinguished by the type of work that they do, which is classified according to its position in the value chain. The lowest-level work is that of data entry, telemarketing, and transcription. The floor manager of the small call center that Gupta visited was aware that there was not much of a future in cold-calling, which is what they were doing for most of their clients. She emphasized the importance of moving up the value chain to doing more sophisticated tasks, such as customer service and support. Not only were the margins higher in such tasks, but also cold-calling was getting increasingly hazardous because the center was responsible for any fines due to the “DNC.” A company that solicits business from a person registered on the “Do Not Call” list can be fined up to $11,000 for a single mistake, enough to wipe out the profits from an entire contract.

Higher up the value chain are jobs that include credit-card processing, and customer interaction, such as responding to calls made to corporate help numbers, low-end IT support such as that of resetting passwords for employees of large corporations, helping customers with problems on their mortgage pay-
ments, and so on. Finally, the top level of the value chain consists of highly specialized work, like software development and testing done by IT professionals, image interpretation conducted by radiologists, corporate earnings and tax-related work done by accountants, and legal research conducted by lawyers for corporate offices in the USA and the UK.

Although not all jobs that are outsourced go from the North to the South, the geographical distribution of outsourced jobs is uneven and hierarchical in that (a) some regions in the North serve primarily, though not exclusively, as “senders” of outsourced jobs and others in the South as primarily “receivers” of this work, and (b) the kind of work sent to “receiving” regions depends on the skill and technology levels that the work requires, the prevailing political climate, the economic policy context, and so on. While transnational corporations are key players in the circuit of outsourcing, national and regional states (both in those regions where outsourced jobs originate and those in which these jobs end up) are also important actors.

Let us first turn to those states that serve primarily as destinations of outsourced jobs, and to India in particular. What do outsourcing and call centers have to do with the Indian state, especially the post-liberalization state? The usual answer to this question is that the state provides the larger macroeconomic framework and the critical infrastructure for outsourcing to be successful. The costs of this infrastructure are social but corporations who use the infrastructure at highly subsidized rates privately appropriate its benefits. However, most cheerleaders of the technology revolution in India summarily dismiss this argument. Typical of such positions is the one articulated by Thomas Friedman: “In some ways, the whole tech sector in Bangalore could be called India’s ‘Golden Enclave’ – disconnected from the country’s bad governance, as companies create their own walled enclaves, with their own electricity, bus service, telecommunications and security, and disconnected from the countryside, where many Indians still live in abject poverty” (2004: B7). Here we have a familiar narrative of the bracing impact of a progressive global capitalism succeeding despite states that fail to deliver basic infrastructure. Thus, Friedman finds that Bangalore’s airport is like “a seedy bus station with airplanes” (2004). Anyone who has navigated the potholes outside the gleaming call-center buildings, giant air-conditioned malls, and world-class luxury apartment buildings in Gurgaon would have to agree with this narrative of the “relative autonomy” of capitalist enclaves from the provisioning of infrastructure by the local state.

But there are other benefits that the Indian state provides that enable outsourcing to succeed, most notably that the export of IT services is tax-exempt, and that the technology that such centers require can be imported without paying duty. The most important service, however, is the training given to graduates of state institutions of higher education that creates a large pool of technically adept English-speaking workers available for hire. Although many news stories about the growth of call centers mention this pool of labor, almost none of the reports, especially in the foreign press, comment on the fact that this is the remarkable result of a conscious Nehruvian import-substituting, socialist, autarchic model of
development. Both the Bharatiya Janata Party-led Indian government and the press had launched broad critiques of the Nehruvian model, but in embracing the "technical excellence" of India’s graduates, failed to consider that the current situation is the direct result of at least two generations of state-sponsored investment in scientific and technical education. These workers are not, for the most part, graduates of private universities; their university educations are obtained almost free of charge in public institutions, probably the cheapest education of such a high quality to be found anywhere in the world. The success of the call centers hinges on the availability of this labor force, which can supply labor power of superior quality at a tenth of the price that would be paid in the USA or the UK. Of course, the 300,000 (DiCarlo 2003) college graduates hired by call centers in the last two years benefit the Indian state by helping to increase the tax base and boosting domestic spending and, thus, tax collection. More importantly, these companies absorb the most politically problematic sector of the workforce, the educated unemployed.

The flight of jobs from the North to the South also implicates Northern states, in which the bulk of outsourced work originates, in multiple ways. While outsourcing of customer-service and data-processing jobs has been a key corporate strategy for some time, it is increasingly also being deployed by state bureaucracies who are under pressure to downsize government and decrease costs. Thus, we find airline ticket stubs being processed in Barbados (Freeman 2002), while New York City’s parking tickets are processed in Ghana (Worth 2002). Some US states, such as Wisconsin and New Jersey, have farmed out their welfare-processing functions and other governmental contracts to businesses in the global South.

Both corporate and government outsourcing have come under increasingly severe scrutiny and criticism in the North. In the USA, for example, outsourcing emerged as a key issue in the 2004 presidential elections. One of the most important fears fueling the backlash against outsourcing is that high-end white-collar workers in the North are now in danger of being displaced by cheaper labor in the South (and especially in the Indian subcontinent). Some of those who cheered the “efficiency” of global competition in hastening the decline of the heavily unionized smokestack industries in the North have now become economic nationalists, as they find themselves in danger of being displaced by the very same capitalist forces. The emergent transnational economic order is not only reshaping the global labor map, but also transforming the relationship between citizenship, national identity, and the state.

Outsourcing is seen as both a sign of state “openness,” modernity, and good macroeconomic liberalization by the defenders of transnational capitalism, and as a charged symbol of decreasing state sovereignty and control by economic nationalists. Concerns about national sovereignty are evident in calls made by various interest groups to the US government to put a stop to the outsourcing of corporate-sector jobs. They are also evidenced by the strong backlash against the contracting of work by government departments to firms that lie outside the territorial boundaries of the US nation-state. For instance, state legislator Shirley Turner of New Jersey introduced a bill in the state senate banning the outsourcing of government contracts
to non-nationals. The bill was passed unanimously. Similarly, in Wisconsin state senator Judy Robson has argued against state contracts to call centers in India. When unemployed residents of Wisconsin call with questions about their Quest card (which replaced food stamps), they talk to someone in India, not Wisconsin. In the context of increased unemployment within the state, Senator Robson contends that it is a “cruel irony that unemployed cardholders find themselves speaking with a person using a fake American name and a fake American accent who is employed through the state of Wisconsin contract. Many of my unemployed constituents would jump at the chance to have a customer service job with a company that has a state contract” (2004: 1). Ms. Robson has drafted a bill called the “American Jobs Act” that seeks to ensure that all state services and contracts must be performed within the United States (Robson 2004).

The striking irony in these discussions about outsourcing is that even as the US national government demands that other nation-states open up their borders to unrestricted trade, capital, and technology and media flows, state governments within the USA are arguing for shutting down their borders to prevent the outflow of jobs. What is at stake in these debates is not simply a concern for rising unemployment within the North. Questions of state sovereignty, the territoriality of the state, and who can “legitimately” do government work loom equally large. The idea is that state jobs are deserved by, and reserved for, “real” citizens (who do not simulate American-ness through “fake” accents or names). In this way, the rhetoric of legislation against the flight of jobs abroad seamlessly weaves together national belonging, citizenship, culture, race, state work, and state control. It articulates a fear of the loss of sovereignty to globalization, which in turn presumes a certain understanding of the state and of the state’s role in governing a territory and the resources and population within that territory.

In this Introduction, we attempt to make anthropological sense of “the state” and the nature of rule in a (neo)liberalizing, transnational world. The organization is as follows. We begin by introducing the problematic. Next we consider what might be involved in an anthropological approach to studying the state by focusing on two aspects for analytical clarity: (a) everyday practices, and (b) representations of the state. We argue that, when combined, these two approaches yield something disciplinarily distinctive in the study of the state. Finally, we tackle the problem of theorizing the state in a transnational frame (see also Trouillot 2003) reflecting, in particular, on its relation to global governmentality.

The Problematic

The title of this Introduction could be parsed such that we first deal with “Rethinking Theories of the State” and then with “Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization.” Our argument here is that new insights into the state could be obtained by thinking about states as cultural artifacts while simultaneously framing
them within transnational dynamics. This complex theoretical task requires (1) examining how cultural and representational frames articulate with structural and functional approaches to studying states, and what they reveal about the deeply cultural nature of states (see Steinmetz 1999); and (2) shifting the focus from a national to a transnational frame, thus highlighting the translocality of the state (Gupta 1995, Chapter 9 in this volume). How can an anthropological approach further our understandings of the state as a multilayered, contradictory, translocal ensemble of institutions, practices, and people in a globalized context? We are especially concerned about the frequent reductionism encountered in public discourse, and sometimes even in scholarly work, in which the equation “more globalization = less nation-state sovereignty = weaker states” appears with some regularity.

Transnational phenomena such as outsourcing make us reconsider how the reorganization of the forces of global capitalism or the regime of accumulation (from Fordism to post-Fordism) has impacted and altered the role of the national state (Jessop 1999; Trouillot 2003). In many popular, official, and expert discourses, the national state is seen as compromised by globalization because globalization challenges the two key concepts that lie at the heart of the idea of a national state – territoriality and sovereignty. The territorial inviolability of nation-states is being contested by border-transgressing circulations of people, images, money, and goods, and the demands of separatist ethnic movements. Such phenomena are rendering national borders porous and states’ control over territories tenuous. State sovereignty is also increasingly challenged by the rise of quasi-“state-like” institutions, like the World Trade Organization (WTO), that operate and regulate the conduct of states, economies, and people at a supranational level. Whether seen from the standpoint of those who profess alarm over the weakening of states, or from the perspective of those neoliberal gurus who advocate the retreat of states in the name of small and more efficient government, the current regime of transnational governance has emerged as a key theoretical, policy, and activist concern. Resistance to different aspects of globalization is itself organized in ways that challenge and go beyond nation-states. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) use the term “transnational networks” to describe loose transborder affiliations of activist groups organized around specific “local” issues like the environment and violence against women (which nevertheless have translocal appeal and organizational potential). These networks transcend the boundaries of nation-states even though they are composed of groups that are located within them. They work by bringing transnational pressure to bear upon individual nation-states and on international institutions such as the WTO.

The nature and role of the state and of sovereignty in a globalized world are hotly debated issues. Whether they argue for a retreat of the state (Ohmae 1990, 1995; Strange 1996), an altered role of the state (Higgott et al. 2000) and of state regulation of the economy (Stiglitz 2002), or market-led regulation and democratization that deprivilege the state (Friedman 1999), scholars who study the globalization–state–economy nexus tend to assume a relatively cohesive national
state (Jessop 1999) and an inevitable analytical link between state and nation. Thus one key issue becomes the extent to which the national state can and should regulate an increasingly globally articulated post-Fordist economy. As we have seen above, this is the critical area of debate in the controversy on outsourcing. Critics of globalization also frequently use the nation as the privileged space within which to pitch their claims. For example, organizations and politicians in the USA that have taken an ultra-nationalist stance against the export of jobs across US borders contend that transnational processes threaten both state sovereignty and the hegemony of the nation-state. The state here is inevitably conceived as a national state and a national economy is seen as the natural object of intervention by this state (Jessop 1999; Mitchell 1999; Steinmetz 1999; Trouillot 2003). While there is some debate about the need for state intervention and about the ability of states to regulate national economies, it is taken for granted that state sovereignty should be territorially based.

Transnational processes have clearly reshaped the presumed association between nation-states, sovereignty, and territoriality. Saskia Sassen uses the term “unbundling of sovereignty” to indicate the altered relationship between the territory of a nation-state and sovereignty in a situation where political power and regulatory mechanisms are being reorganized at a transnational level (1998: 92; see also Sassen 1996). Sovereignty, in other words, can no longer be seen as the sole purview or “right” of the modern state but is, instead, partially disentangled from the nation-state and mapped onto supranational and nongovernmental organizations. As Sassen contends, however, just because some of the regulatory mechanisms that used to be managed by states are now shifting to non-state, supranational actors, it would be wrong to assume that national laws and conventional forms of regulation based in nation-states are now irrelevant. Transnational economic processes and political reorganization may have altered the nature of and the presumed link between sovereignty and territoriality; however, that does not necessarily imply that the nation-state, as a conceptual framework and a material reality, is passe. The hyphen that connects the two parts of this composite entity, as scholars like Ruggie (1993), Appadurai (1990; 1993a), and Gupta (1998) contend, is simultaneously contested and reified by the processes of globalization.

How has the relationship between the state and the nation been theorized in the existing literature? First, the concept of the nation-state has so thoroughly joined the state with the nation that it is almost impossible to think of one without the other (see also Aretxaga 2003; Trouillot 2003). In fact, the terms “the state,” “the nation,” and “the nation-state” are often used interchangeably in scholarly discourse. Theories of the state always have implicit in them theories of nationalism; similarly, theories of nationalism assume some theory of the state in that nationalism is often seen as a state project (Anderson 1983; Borneman 1993, 1998; Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Steinmetz 1999). Second, while theories of nationalism wrestle with questions of cultural difference, theories of the state are largely silent on these questions. States are seen as being devoid of culture. Why is that the case? Does the recognition that nationalism is both an affect and affective

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Note: The text above is a continuation of the preceding discussion and does not provide a complete context for the references cited. The full context is beyond the scope of this snippet.
make it easier to think of its cultural moorings, unlike the state, which is primarily conceptualized in institutional terms (Stoler 2004)? Third, theories of the state assume the frame of the nation-state and a world of nation-states. Here the reification of the state is easy to see – “it” is the legitimate representative of the nation and acts on behalf of the nation. But the shifts in the global order from “inter-nationalism,” which depended on nation-states, to “trans-nationalism,” which has a more troubled relationship with bounded and naturalized nation-states, and the emergence of “state-like” regimes of supranational regulation (consisting of bodies such as the WTO and the European Union) are forcing us to rethink national states (Jessop 1999). What would the state look like in a transnational frame where nation-states are not the only legitimate actors?

What Can Anthropology Contribute to the Study of the State?

The study of the state has particularly, though not exclusively, interested political scientists. Timothy Mitchell (1991b; 1999, Chapter 7 in this volume) identifies two main approaches that postwar American political science has taken in this regard: the systems approach and the statist approach. Systems theorists (for instance see Easton 1953, 1957; Almond et al. 1955; Almond and Coleman 1960) highlighted the difficulties in delineating clear boundaries of “the state” and argued for abandoning the study of states in favor of the broader idea of a “political system.” The changed political context of the 1960s revived an interest in the state and many theorists argued for bringing the state back into scholarly focus (Evans et al. 1985; see also Krasner 1978; Skocpol 1979). However, in their attempt to counter Marxist functionalism that saw the state as the instrument of capitalist class interests, these state-centered theorists, as Mitchell (1999) and Steinmetz (1999) contend, resurrected “the state” as a discrete social fact. In state-centric theories, “the state” is viewed as a clearly bounded institution that is distinct from society, and is often portrayed as a unitary and autonomous actor that possesses the supreme authority to regulate populations within its territory. Scholars like Abrams (1988, Chapter 4 in this volume), Corrigan and Sayer (1985), Jessop (1982, 1990), Joseph and Nugent (1994), Mitchell (1991b, 1999), Radcliffe-Brown (1940), and Trouillot (2003) have critically interrogated the assumption that “the state” is an a priori conceptual or empirical object. Following these scholars we do not take the state as a given – a distinct, fixed and unitary entity that defines the terrain in which other institutions function. Rather, we seek to bring together the ideological and material aspects of state construction, and understand how “the state” comes into being, how “it” is differentiated from other institutional forms, and what effects this construction has on the operation and diffusion of power throughout society.

Mitchell (1991b; 1999, Chapter 7 in this volume) has argued that the appearance of the state as a discrete and relatively autonomous social institution is itself a reification that is constituted through everyday social practices. How the line separating the state from civil society comes to be drawn, he claims, becomes an
exercise in power and social control. Indeed, the discipline of political science, along with other social sciences, in analyzing and describing the phenomenon of the state, has participated in discursively constructing “the state” as a distinct entity with particular functions (Abrams 1988, Chapter 4 in this volume). Disciplinary practices help shape both everyday understandings of what “the state” is and what “it” does as well as influence the practices of state agents. Nikolas Rose (1996, Chapter 6 in this volume; 1999) suggests that social science disciplines and “experts” themselves constitute a crucial part of the apparatus of rule – they become instruments through which strategies for governing populations and communities, and fashioning proper selves, are deployed and legitimized. Further, these theoretical conceptualizations shape activist practices vis-à-vis the state. Anannya Bhattacharjee (1997, Chapter 14 in this volume) shows how feminist conceptions of the public and private realms have impacted feminist praxis in relation to the state in problematic ways. She uses the issues of domestic labor and domestic violence in immigrant South Asian communities in the USA to illustrate the potential pitfalls of hegemonic Western feminist notions of public and private spheres and their practices against the state (see also Brown 1995, Chapter 8 in this volume; MacKinnon 1989).

Once we see that the boundary between the state and civil society is itself an effect of power, then we can begin to conceptualize “the state” within (and not automatically distinct from) other institutional forms through which social relations are lived, such as the family, civil society, and the economy. Such an analysis of state formation does not simply assume that the state stands at the apex of society and is the central locus of power. Instead, the problem becomes one of figuring out how “the state” comes to assume its vertical position as the supreme authority that manages all other institutional forms that social relations take (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), and that functions as the super-coordinator of the governance of social and individual conduct by these other institutions (Hansen and Stepputat 2001).

In addition, analyzing the process of state formation impels us to reconsider the mechanics of rule and workings of power through such apparently mundane state activities as the collection of taxes, the distribution of subsidized food to the poor, or the issuance of passports. Following these everyday tracks of rule, process, and surplus extraction allows us to study the operation of power in a disaggregated manner and to de-emphasize the state as the ultimate seat of power (Foucault 1979; Foucault 1991, Chapter 5 in this volume; Steinmetz 1999). It enables us to examine the dispersed institutional and social networks through which rule is coordinated and consolidated, and the roles that “non-state” institutions, communities, and individuals play in mundane processes of governance (see also Trouillot 2003) – processes which Foucault termed the “etatisation of society” (Foucault 1991:103; emphasis in original) and that Nikolas Rose has called the “de-statization of government” (1996:56).

Anthropology offers an especially useful lens with which to examine state formation (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Joseph and Nugent 1994) and understand how the “state” and its boundaries are culturally constructed. Anthropology’s
focus on particular branches and levels of state institutions enables a disaggregated view of “the state” that shows the multilayered, pluri-centered, and fluid nature of this ensemble that congeals different contradictions (Hall 1986, Chapter 15 in this volume). The anthropological project attempts to understand the conditions in which the state successfully represents itself as coherent and singular (Gupta 1995, Chapter 9 in this volume).

Second, anthropology brings to the foreground the role of cultural difference in forming and informing states. Steinmetz (1999) has argued that while culture has not been entirely ignored in historical and comparative analyses of states, it has generally not been accorded a central or even crucial place in processes of state formation. According to Steinmetz, both (neo) Marxist and (neo) Weberian accounts tend to see culture as produced by the state, but do not see states as effects of cultural processes. In Weber’s developmentalist conception of the state, culture did not matter where the bureaucratic rationality of modern states was concerned (Weber 1968, Chapter 1 in this volume). Steinmetz contends that neo-Weberian accounts of the state (Evans et al. 1985) also neglect culture – they view culture as lying firmly on the “society” side of the state–society divide. When culture is included in such analyses, Steinmetz argues, it is often essentialized as a system of elite or expert ideas (1999: 17–18).

Structural and functional conceptions of the state view it as a set of institutions that perform specific functions related to governance and security, as in Weber’s famous dictum about the state possessing a monopoly over violence in a given territory. The classification of regimes and states into various categories, such as “bureaucratic authoritarian” or “liberal democratic,” for instance, not only takes the meanings of terms like “authoritarian” and “democratic” to be self-evident, but is also premised on a certain set of core assumptions about the nature and function of states. Such a comparative analysis of states rests on the assumption that the units being compared to each other – states – are essentially similar. If cultural difference matters to such forms of analyses, then it is only as a variable and often not a very important variable (Steinmetz 1999). For if cultural difference truly mattered, then states that are institutionally similar would “be” and mean very different things. For example, a liberal democratic state and a totalitarian state might actually look alike at the level of everyday practices of state bureaucracies. Instead of presuming that similarly classified states share a “natural” likeness and affinity, an anthropological lens forces us to critically interrogate the assumption that cultural difference is epiphenomenal to the functional and structural characteristics of states.

Many comparative and classificatory analyses of states, such as those that rank states as “weak” or “strong,” effectively strip the unit of analysis – the state – from its cultural moorings. When a state does not have a fully developed set of functional elements or if such elements are completely absent, that nation-state is classified as having a “transitioning” or “weak” state or a “stateless” society (see Weber, 1968, Chapter 1 in this volume). In addition, such exercises take for granted that “fully developed” and “ideal” states are Western liberal democratic ones. Western states are thus often employed as the norm against which other
states are judged; the criteria for a “strong” state are almost always those that apply to a specific subset of Western nation-states.

An anthropological perspective allows us to pay careful attention to the cultural constitution of the state – that is, how people perceive the state, how their understandings are shaped by their particular locations and intimate and embodied encounters with state processes and officials, and how the state manifests itself in their lives. Analyzing these cultural processes through which “the state” is instantiated and experienced also enables us to see that the illusion of cohesion and unitariness created by states is always contested and fragile, and is the result of hegemonic processes that should not be taken for granted.

The Cultural Constitution of States I: Everyday Practices

Anthropological analyses of the state, then, begin with the counter-intuitive notion that states that are structurally similar may nonetheless be profoundly different from each other in terms of the meanings they have for their populations. Cultural struggles determine what a state means to its people, how it is instantiated in their daily lives, and where its boundaries are drawn. These cultural struggles are waged in the sphere of representation but also in the domain of the everyday practices of state agencies. In emphasizing the “cultural constitution” of states, therefore, we are primarily interested in these two interrelated aspects of states.

The sphere of everyday practices is the primary arena in which people learn something about the state. Whether it is the practice of standing in line to obtain monthly rations or to mail a letter, getting a statement notarized or answering the questions of an official surveyor, paying taxes or getting audited, applying for a passport or attending a court hearing, the state as an institution is substantiated in people’s lives through the apparently banal practices of bureaucracies. What the state means to people such as government officials situated inside a bureaucracy, as well as to those outside, such as the clients of government programs and other citizens, is profoundly shaped through the routine and repetitive procedures of bureaucracies.

At one level this proceduralism is so thoroughly commonplace and ordinary as to be uninteresting. It is therefore not surprising, as scholars such as James Ferguson (1994) have pointed out, that bureaucratic proceduralism is considered “apolitical” (see Weber 1968, Chapter 1 in this volume), consisting as it does of the technical work of the state. At another level, however, it is these putatively technical and unremarkable practices that render tenable the political tasks of state formation, governance, and the exertion of power. An example is provided by James C. Scott’s (1998; Chapter 10 in this volume) work on the techniques of urban planning. Practices like mapping and surveying, Scott demonstrates, work as important parts of the apparatus of legibility and control – they mold what states see, how they govern, and how the population, in turn, perceives states.

Mundane bureaucratic procedures thus provide important clues to understanding the micropolitics of state work, how state authority and government operate in
people’s daily lives, and how the state comes to be imagined, encountered, and reimagined by the population. For example, the Indian state is often characterized as one in which “rule-following” behavior is the bureaucratic norm. Violating rules to accomplish necessary tasks can incur severe negative penalties. Nonetheless, one sees high levels of corruption and actions, regularly taken, which contravene existing rules (see Gupta, Chapter 9 in this volume). What one finds in a case such as this is that an excessive devotion to proceduralism itself either creates the possibility of actions that exploit mutually contradictory rules of procedure, or forces bureaucrats and their clients to skirt the rules. When conflicts arise within the bureaucracy, rules are often used to bring errant subordinates into line.

An ethnographic example from lower-level state bureaucracies in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India can help to clarify this point. The Integrated Child Development Services or ICDS is a nation-wide government development program targeting young children and women. It was launched in Mandi subdistrict of UP (where Gupta conducted his ethnography) in 1985, with the goal of providing a set of services that consisted of supplementary nutrition for pregnant women and young children, and education, immunizations, and preventive medicine for poor and lower-caste children.19

Gupta observed that all officials had to routinely maintain a detailed travel log which contained separate entries on where those individuals were going, what time they left the office, whom they went to meet and for what purpose, when they were expected back, and when they actually returned. This travel log had to be filled out before they left the office. The register could be double-checked with the logbook and mileage on the official jeep, which also had to be filled out every time the jeep was driven for official work.

On one occasion, Asha Agarwal, head of the ICDS Program in Mandi district, showed Gupta her travel log, where some lines had been scribbled in between the regularly spaced register-entries. She told him that her supervisor had reprimanded her for making up visits and falsifying her travel record.20 She said that sometimes she just forgot to make an entry in the register. She pointed out that the particular day for which her supervisor had upbraided her was the day she had gone to meet the District Magistrate (the highest-ranking official in the entire administrative area). This was certainly not a meeting that she could have made up, given the importance and position of the official involved. Nonetheless, her supervisor suspected that she was cheating because she did not follow the procedure of making an entry in her travel log. The fact that she had a crucial substantive meeting with the district’s head official held less importance for him than observing the correct bureaucratic rule.

The outcome of a circumvention of the rules might very well be desirable since the rules themselves are often arcane colonial accretions, but any effort to make things work at the expense of following the rules inevitably brings forth accusations of corruption. Since charges of corruption are closely tied to questions of legitimacy (a corrupt government is widely seen as an illegitimate one), and since state legitimacy itself depends on what states mean to their citizens, the routine
practices of bureaucracies become intimately linked to cultural contestation and construction.

Official procedures are not devised or directed by anyone in particular. They are authorless strategies through which power is exercised and inequalities instituted (Ferguson 1994). Looking at everyday practices therefore allows us to disentangle intentionality from the operation of power. Examining everyday state practices also allows us to understand how state institutions are both recognized and reproduced – sometimes silently, without drawing attention to themselves, and at other times through asserting their presence and power – through the daily work of bureaucracies.

The structure of bureaucratic authority depends on the repetitive re-enactment of everyday practices. These iterative practices are performative (Butler 1990) in that rather than being an outward reflection of a coherent and bounded state “core” they actually constitute that very core. It is through these re-enactments that the coherence and continuity of state institutions is constituted and sometimes destabilized. Using the model of performativity to understand bureaucratic practices and political spectacles (Taylor 1997) is useful in another sense as well. Performances assume an interface between actors and spectators; performances both constitute and are constituted by an audience. The repetitive performance of state procedures, for a variety of audiences located at different levels (such as rural peasants, local and national bureaucrats, activists, international development or human rights experts, and officials of other nation-states), shapes audiences’ ideas about the translocal nature of the state and their relationship to “it.”

Proceduralism, the banal repetition of everyday actions, and the mundane realities of following precedent, reproduce “the state” as an institution across time and space. But do such actions do more than just (re)produce the conditions that allow for the continuity of an institution? We argue that they do much more. It is through such mundane activities that the primacy of the state is reproduced, and its superiority over other social institutions established. And it is through the daily routines of proceduralism and precedent setting that social inequalities, such as those of class and gender, are produced and maintained.

One simple example may make this clear. The Indian state places a high value on writing for its everyday procedures. Whether it is an application or a complaint, unless it is submitted in writing, it has little value, as it is not “actionable.” Given the high levels of rural illiteracy, especially given the gendered inequalities of rural schooling, the state’s emphasis on the written word immediately places poor, uneducated people, and particularly low-caste, non-literate women, in a position of disadvantage. Many state-implemented development and empowerment programs are purportedly intended to reduce economic and social inequality; yet it is ironic that the very procedures of state institutions perpetuate, rather than reduce, those inequalities. Upper-class and higher-caste men are often better situated to take advantage of state programs than poorer and lower-caste women.

The premium placed on writing and proper procedure in official circles forces grassroots women’s development and empowerment programs, which attempt to challenge and alter social inequalities, to train their staff and clients in
constructing proper paper trails. Aradhana Sharma studied one such women’s empowerment program initiated by the Government of India, called the Mahila Samakhya (henceforth “MS”) program, in the eastern part of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (UP). MS seeks to empower low-caste poor rural women, through collective consciousness-raising and mobilization, to challenge caste, class, and gender oppression, engender social change, and develop themselves and their communities. The power of writing was brought home to Sharma when some MS program participants claimed that “empowered” women were those who knew how to “wield the pen.” Wielding the pen implied having the knowledge required to negotiate the world of the powerful: men, officials, and people with salaried jobs. These women, the majority of whom were non-literate, understood that their struggles for social change depended on their access to basic literacy skills, to knowledge of state procedures (which themselves required reading and writing skills), and to sympathetic and supportive officials. Demands for development, for example, which are a crucial component of social change efforts, almost always reference the state. The postcolonial Indian state has positioned itself as the harbinger of national development, and its legitimacy is crucially tied to its development efforts (see Chatterjee 1993, 1998; Gupta 1998; Ludden 1992). MS participants were aware of the centrality of the state to their transformative mobilizations. They knew that if they were to expect any action on development goals by local bureaucrats, they must forward their concerns in writing and keep officially stamped copies of all correspondence.

Whenever any demand for village development, such as digging a well, constructing a road, or building subsidized housing, arose in MS villages where Sharma did her fieldwork, MS staff members assisted program participants in writing formal applications addressed to local development bureaucrats like Block Development Officers (BDOs). They made two copies of all applications. The staff members either read the contents of the applications out loud, or, alternatively, MS participants asked some schoolgoing child in the village to read the applications so as to make sure that their concerns were correctly represented in written form. Program participants then submitted the applications at the local Block Office, the lowest tier in the state’s developmental bureaucracy, ensuring that the receiving official stamped them with “received” and signed both copies of the application. They kept one copy of the signed and stamped application for their records. While following the proper procedure and documenting their interactions with officials through paper trails did not necessarily ensure that their requests were met, it enabled MS women to voice a “legitimate” critique of local bureaucrats’ inaction, when and if they had to take up the issue with higher-level bureaucrats. Demands made on paper made possible a certain degree of accountability.

The reproduction of the state as an institution through bureaucratic practices, however, is not as smooth and inevitable a process as it sometimes appears. People may, to various degrees, be suspicious or critical of the premium placed on the written word by state officials, and resist the hierarchicalism and proceduralism inherent in bureaucratic practices. The possibility of subversion always looms large. Routine activities of recording, like the census, give us a sense of how
much people avoid being literally written into state registers (see Scott 1998, Chapter 10 in this volume; Appadurai 1993b; Cohn 1987). During one such rural appraisal drive undertaken by the MS program in the village of Banipur in eastern UP, which Sharma observed, some residents simply refused to participate while others participated in the hope of deriving some material benefit. MS workers arrived in Banipur in the usual blue program jeep, which had government license plates, and introduced MS as a Government of India program. Banipur’s residents thus viewed the census exercise as an official encounter. Some of them simply walked away from the MS staff – they did not want to be recorded in “official” registers. One female resident said to the surveyors, “You will write our names for the purpose of your job and leave. Meanwhile we will continue to live our lives of drudgery.” Not only did she refuse to divulge her name unless she was given money in exchange for providing personal information but in a parodic reversal of authority, asked for the names of the surveyors in return for revealing hers. Other residents agreed to be surveyed, but used this encounter to criticize the general lack of government-provided development facilities in the village and to ask for help. Many residents who participated in the survey asked to be placed in the “below poverty line” category in the hope of receiving the government assistance earmarked for the poorest, and thus sought material benefits and social capital in exchange for being counted.

Such incidents demonstrate two key things. First, they show the extent to which representations, symbols, practices, and materiality are interlinked. Jeeps with official license plates, and development workers with census forms and a particular tone of voice are markers of power and status. Rural residents read such markers in specific ways. They associate these symbols with statist authority (which is critiqued but also taken seriously); this authority, however, comes with moral responsibility for poverty alleviation and development. The Banipur incident clearly illustrates how state representations are connected with both the fabric of power inequalities and with material need. Second, such incidents demonstrate how those outside state institutions contest the reproduction of social inequalities contained within such apparently innocuous state procedures such as that of data collection.

These subversions, however, are not limited to those at the receiving end of state practices. Bureaucrats may not carry out the orders of their superiors in a proper manner or they may adhere to the letter but not to the spirit of policy directives, thereby disrupting the smooth functioning of the state system. As James Ferguson’s work on Lesotho demonstrates, the intentions and goals of high-ranking officials (as, for instance, in the context of state-initiated development programs) may either never be realized during the implementation of these programs or may work out in unintended ways with unlikely consequences. Also, officials at lower levels of state bureaucracies may not support programs initiated by others higher up in the hierarchy, and might even actively try to sabotage the execution and goals of initiatives planned from above. This was apparent in the everyday workings of the MS program. Even though MS is a state-initiated program, it did not receive unequivocal support within the governmental system.
MS is a program of the New Delhi-based central government. While many senior administrators in the central government clearly supported the program, some stated that MS did not receive full government backing at national level because it was a program with a relatively small budget. MS’s low budget is a direct consequence of the fact that it does not disburse material benefits to its participants. This put MS at a disadvantage in a political context in which the status, capital, and power of state officials are linked to their ability to distribute benefits. The program also faced a potentially more dangerous constraint in that many officials, across various levels of the bureaucracy, were suspicious of a program that overtly attempted to “empower” its women beneficiaries and to challenge intertwined social and state hierarchies. MS staff members often recounted the ignorance or active hostility they encountered from officials, especially at the lower (block and district) levels of the bureaucracy. While some local bureaucrats did not think that a low-budget women’s empowerment program was worthy of their attention, others openly expressed their suspicions about a program that had women’s empowerment as its explicit goal. “What does ‘empowerment’ mean?” they asked. Some went further and asked MS workers if they intended to break up families by empowering women.

Paying attention to everyday bureaucratic practices thus brings to light the sources and nature of interbureaucratic conflicts, which may help explain impediments to the proper implementation of development programs. It also illustrates the vexed and discordant processes through which the state (and its attendant inequalities) is reproduced. Intra-institutional conflict is considered dysfunctional in the ideal-type Weberian bureaucracy – it poses obstacles to the smooth functioning and reproduction of the institution. Yet we argue that far from being symbols of the improper development of states, these conflicts, “corruptions,” and inconsistencies are central to institutional organization and the reproduction of states.

Finally, the routine practices of state bureaucracies help establish limits of the state to produce what Timothy Mitchell (Chapter 7, this volume) calls the “effect of the state.” The line between state and non-state realms is partly drawn by bureaucrats’ everyday work practices and encounters with others. For example, Sharma (forthcoming) shows how everyday discussions between officials and development activists about the structure and workings of development programs, meetings between local bureaucrats and NGO workers, and interactions between NGO workers and participants of development programs help (re)draw the line between state and non-state realms, and constitute what the state is and what it does. Drawing upon the structure and functioning of the MS program as a “GONGO” (Government Organized Non-Governmental Organization), and the discussions about MS’s hybrid form that took place between government and non-governmental representatives, Sharma ethnographically elaborates the processes by which the state is discursively produced as an entity that is distinct from and sits above the non-state realm. MS’s hybrid “GONGO” form attempts to fuse together the positive aspects of governmental and non-governmental development strategies (for example, combining the “reach” of the state with the “bot-
tom-up” or grassroots approach of NGOs). Yet, even as this hybrid structure tries to transcend the boundary between state and non-state arenas, it simultaneously rests on the assumption that the state and non-state realms exist in “pure,” mutually exclusive forms.

The boundary between state and non-state realms is thus drawn through the contested cultural practices of bureaucracies, and people’s encounters with, and negotiations of, these practices. Everyday statist encounters not only shape people’s imagination of what the state is and how it is demarcated, but also enable people to devise strategies of resistance to this imagined state. Those who are the subjects or targets of state programs, and thus “outside” bureaucracies, learn to use the very same techniques that lower-level state agents use to sabotage official mandates and orders. They learn about paper pushing, leaving paper trails, and adopting official mannerisms. They use these practices in their everyday interactions with officials to gain institutional access or to subvert official scrutiny; they also use them when interacting with non-officials in order to establish their authority over others.

Official practices, therefore, are not only redeployed as strategies of resistance (and thus always dangerously mired within the logic of bureaucratic power), but they are also not limited to “the state.” Practices of bureaucratic hierarchicalism and proceduralism spread from state institutions into “non-state” realms, as the earlier example of MS participants following proper application procedures for demanding development facilities demonstrated. Similarly, MS program workers routinely used bureaucratic techniques to subvert governmental authority and get their work done (Sharma forthcoming). As employees of a government-initiated program, MS staff members were not allowed to participate in anti-government mobilizations. Yet many actually did so by taking time off work, putting “official” leave applications on file, and participating in anti-government protests as regular citizens or as NGO workers. MS’s dual identity, as both a governmental and non-governmental program, gave staff members room to maneuver around governmental dictates. Some MS workers told Sharma that they kept two program letterheads on file. The first, a letterhead that represents MS as an NGO, was used when writing non-confrontational, support-seeking letters (for instance, to other grassroots organizations). Staff members used a second program identification, with its official “Ministry of Human Resource Development” letterhead, when they wanted to put pressure on someone. As one MS employee explained, “We… stamp our seal on these letters…[and] write them exactly like government letters are written.” Hence, in order to appear “official,” MS employees used appropriate letterheads, seals, signatures, and tone of voice. They deployed the state’s disciplinary procedures to get things accomplished and to deter possible repression from officials. This dispersal of the techniques of regulation and government throughout society also illustrates the governmentalization of society (Foucault 1991).

In sum, then, bureaucratic practices are a crucial mechanism through which the shifting effect of the state is produced and reproduced. There is, however, nothing straightforward or obvious about the production and reproduction of the state
effect. Everyday practices are also important because they are signifying practices, and this brings us into the complex relationship of such practices with the sphere of the circulation of representations of the state.

The Cultural Constitution of States II: Representations

Representations comprise another key modality through which states are culturally constituted, and through which state power is enacted. People learn about particular state agencies and officers at local and national levels through newspapers (Gupta 1995, Chapter 9 in this volume); they read government reports about topics such as population control, as Anagnost (1995) demonstrates in her work on China; they discuss their experiences of particular bureaucracies and officials in different forums; they watch election-related propaganda on television or listen to speeches by elected officials at public rallies; they observe military parades, activities, and violence (Lutz 2002, Chapter 12 in this volume; Taylor 1997); and they participate in other ceremonial rituals staged by state officials, for example, to inaugurate a dam (Tennekoon 1988), initiate a village housing scheme (Brow 1996), or to celebrate national independence. It is in the realm of representation that explicit discourse of the state is produced. Public cultural representations and performance of statehood crucially shape people’s perceptions about the nature of the state.

Employees of various bureaucratic institutions also come to understand the entity they work for as well as their place in it through the representational sphere. For instance, banal techniques of representation such as official letterheads, seals, memos, photographs of official buildings, special uniforms, spatial arrangements of offices, monitoring and surveillance visits by senior officials, cars with government license plates and official motorcades, personnel files and procedures for promotion, and organizational charts, play a key role in presenting “the state” and its organizational hierarchy to its functionaries. The public circulation and dissemination of such images of “the state” and of state leaders and their actions enable people at different levels of the bureaucracy, as well as those outside these institutions, to imagine what the state is, what it is supposed to do, where its boundaries lie, and what their place is in relation to state institutions.

How does one study the “represented” state? Textual analysis is one key method, which might entail analyzing statistical reports and examining other kinds of public cultural narratives which have come into focus since the “cultural turn” (Steinmetz 1999) but still remain understudied. Here we are thinking of public cultural texts such as newspapers, radio, television, and cinematic representations of the state, and reports and leaflets produced by government and nongovernment agencies. Analyses of how states are represented intertextually, that is, across different media (for example, television and print media) and in documents produced by diverse agencies (for example, country reports published by the World Bank or national plans produced by governments), and the circulation
of representations transnationally, nationally, and regionally become very important. Such analyses permit us to tease out shifts, overlaps, and disjunctures in the (re)production of the state in a spatial frame that transcends the nation. Besides examining the production and circulation of discourses about the state, ethnographies of the state also involve analyzing how messages about the state are interpreted and mobilized by people according to their particular contexts and social locations.

It is also through these kinds of specific and “localized” images and experiences that the state is discursively imagined as something greater than simply its local manifestations. Public cultural discourses about corrupt state officials and a generally corrupt state system, as Akhil Gupta (Chapter 9, this volume) illustrates, allow people to connect up the disparate levels of the state and imagine it as a “translocal” entity. Representational techniques such as organizational charts, official seals, and photographs of state leaders help suture the various levels of bureaucracy into an apparently neat, organized, distinct, and coherent whole, and define state functionaries’ relation to this larger system. By lending to the state a veneer of consistency, systematicity, centralized control, and wholeness, and by thus eliding the messiness, contradictions, and tensions that states congeal, statist representations play a crucial role in entrenching the borders and vertical authority of the state and in shaping resistance to the state.

We want to make two further points of clarification here. First, although we have made an analytical distinction between everyday bureaucratic practices and statist representations, these are, in effect, deeply co-implicated and mutually constitutive. How people experience bureaucratic practices is shaped by representations of the state; in turn, how people read representations is mediated by their daily encounters with bureaucratic practices. This dialectic operates not only for citizens but for bureaucrats as well. What needs to be analyzed here is how contradictory representations of the state are interpreted and operationalized in the everyday practices of bureaucrats. Furthermore, we need to understand how these practices fit within the “institutional culture” of the state while simultaneously reshaping both the institution and its representations.

The dialectic between practices and representations also opens up the possibility of dissonance between ideas of the state gleaned from representations and those arising from encounters with particular officials. Such discords and differences can lead to a rearticulation of peoples’ relationship to the state. The sometimes conflicting effects of the state produced by the complex dialectic between practices and representations rupture the hegemony and singularity of the state, and highlight the contradictions that it congeals.

The second point we wish to make is that focusing on practices and representations of the state allows us to see their central role in the perpetration of exploitation and inequality. It enables us to examine the mechanisms by which the extraction and redistribution of surplus, and the reproduction of the relations of production, are accomplished and legitimated. Delineating precisely how ruling class ideologies are mobilized, how they become state ideology, and how they reproduce inequalities, even if never in a straightforward or unchallenged
manner, presents a vexing theoretical problem (see Althusser 1971, Chapter 3 in this volume; Gramsci 1971, Chapter 2 in this volume). Analyses of ideological entrenchment and shifts in different institutional and social sites, through everyday statist practices and representations, are important because they suggest how and where struggles against marginalization and exploitation can be waged.

We earlier illustrated how everyday statist proceduralism, and the reliance on literacy and written documents in particular, encode and reinforce class, caste, and gender privilege. Similarly, ethnographically examining encounters among state officials, and between bureaucrats, politicians, and their constituents reveals how the state is made “real” in people’s lives through the self-representational practices of those in power. We might, for instance, look at how government, GONGO, and even NGO employees present themselves as agents of the state, or as bearers of a special status by virtue of their association with the state, and how they also present their particular institution and position within and outside the bureaucratic hierarchy. What tone, language, and manner of dress do they adopt in different contexts, and how is that linked with power and authority? Or, for example, how do seating arrangements at meetings between officials and non-officials reflect and reinforce hierarchy? How official and non-official groups of people interact among themselves and with each other might illustrate the concrete ways in which the distinction between state and non-state arenas and social hierarchies are mobilized in everyday state practices, what kinds of social capital and power are associated with this work, and how this official status intersects with and feeds upon existing, contextually specific social hierarchies. Such analyses would reveal how ideologies of gender and class difference are ensconced in and operationalized through different institutional mechanisms (including but not limited to “conventional” state apparatuses), how these ideologies shift over time, how they reconstitute difference, and how they can be challenged and altered.

What we have outlined above are some of the key reasons why states need to be seen as cultural artifacts and effects, and the role that anthropology has played and can continue to play in this endeavor. We now move on to elaborating the second main axis of our argument – seeing states through the prism of transnationalism – and make a case for taking a transnational approach to the study of states.

**States in a Transnational Frame**

To see the role that transnational discourses play in constructing states, consider the example of how statistical reports published by United Nations (UN) agencies, such as the Human Development Report, and the World Bank represent Third World states by ranking them in a decreasing order of development. James Ferguson (1994), for instance, demonstrates how the World Bank produces Lesotho as a Least Developed Country, or an LDC, which then connotes a certain set of characteristics, needs, and interventions (see also Mitchell 1991a). Trans-
national development discourse also positions states as primary agents for national
development and as the chief institutions for the implementation of policy. Economic development interventions, through such instruments as Structural Ad-
justment Programs, take place through negotiations between transnational
development organizations and government officials. Representatives of non-
governmental organizations or NGOs are rarely included in these negotiations. The image of the classic “developmentalist” Third World state can thus itself be viewed as a partial effect of transnational development discourse. Such a location has material consequences for how governments and officials understand the mandate for national development and how they, in turn, represent it to their citizens.

For instance, the scramble by officials and elected leaders around the world to appear democratic, reorganize institutions in civil society, streamline state agencies, and represent their governments as improved and more efficient, must be read in the context of the global circulation of neoliberal discourses of good governance, the strengthening of civil society, privatization, and the rollback of welfare programs (see Barry et al. 1996; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Paley 2002; Rose 1996, Chapter 6 in this volume). While the particular shape that this reorganization takes varies across postcolonial and postsocialist contexts, as do its social and cultural effects, neoliberalism or “advanced liberalism” (Rose 1996, Chapter 6 in this volume) is critically reshaping the representations and contours of “the state,” and the forms and modalities of government and rule. Analyzing these shifts sheds light on the nature of the political rationality that underwrites neoliberalism.

For example, the neoliberal focus on smaller government, as Nikolas Rose (1996, Chapter 6 in this volume) argues, illustrates the market logic that guides it and the new forms of rule that secure it. Leaner government does not translate into less regulation or weaker states – in fact, it ends up proliferating the sites for regulation and domination by creating “autonomous” entities of government that are not part of the formal state apparatus and are guided by the enterprise logic (Burchell 1996; see also Barry, et al. 1996). This government-at-a-distance involves social institutions such as non-governmental organizations, schools, communities, and even individuals that are removed from a centralized state apparatus and are made responsible for activities that were heretofore carried out by state agencies.

The currently popular discourses of “participation,” “empowerment,” and “democratization” take this line of thinking to its logical conclusion (see Chatterjee 2004; Cruikshank 1999; Leve 2001; Paley 2001; Sharma forthcoming). The deployment of these terms as strategies of governance rests on tutoring people to build their capacities and become self-dependent, responsible citizens who can take care of their own welfare and govern themselves. This provides yet another example of the neoliberal “unloading” of public services onto empowered and “responsibilized” selves and communities who, as Julia Paley (2002) suggests, are thereby made complicit in the contemporary workings of power and governance.

Current usage of empowerment, democracy, civil society, and good governance discourses points to a reconfigured global apparatus of rule – neoliberalism – that
reflects the post-Fordist regime of global capitalism (Jessop 1999). One way to comprehend the underlying logic of neoliberalism is through observing changes in how it is publicly represented. Does neoliberalism necessarily include a key transformation in how the nature, boundary, and role of the state are represented? If so, then one of the important tasks at hand is to critically interrogate the politics of the ostensibly “shrinking” boundaries of the state that have accompanied the emergence of flexible capitalism and quasi-autonomous “state-like” institutions at supra- and sub-national levels. One could argue, for instance, that the state in the neoliberal moment is contracting in two ways. First, the transnational organization of global capitalism is forcing a different regime of regulation of national economies by their respective states. Some forms of regulation, like tariffs on trade, are being weakened and governed by transnational organizations such as the WTO; other forms of regulation, such as immigration and increasingly aggressive forms of policing, are being strengthened.

Second, states are increasingly unable to perform their redistributive role: the resources they are able to extract and distribute are becoming smaller. In the case of postcolonial “Third World” states, liberalization policies and transnational governance mechanisms like Structural Adjustment Programs and austerity measures have played a significant role in the shrinking of these resources. In such a context, the “privatization” of the state entails a dispersal of the state’s governance and redistributive functions to non-state and charitable organizations. While this farming out may well signal a “degovernmentalization of the state” (Barry et al. 1996: 11) or a “de-statization of government” (Rose 1996: 56), it also represents an increased governmentalization of society (Foucault 1991).

Jessop (1999) argues that the state in the post-Fordist, neoliberal context is a qualitatively new state form and we need to shift our frame of analysis from government to governance. He contends that while the Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS) of the Euro-American type may well be eroding, by becoming denationalized, destatized, and internationalized, not all national state forms are necessarily retreating. How does one make sense of the transformation of welfare states in different parts of the postcolonial world, which may never have had the resources of Keynesian welfare state? Clearly the imperatives, processes, and implications of the “rollback” of postcolonial welfare states will be quite different from those of the Keynesian welfare states in the North. The micro-politics of these seismic shifts, and their implications for the cultural construction of the state and the reorganization of authority, need to be delineated through careful ethnographic and historical analyses.

The key advantage that the frame of transnationalism brings to the study of states is that it forces us to rethink the triad “state–territory–people” and the presumed symmetry of its constituent parts. For example, the Weberian notion of the state defines it as: (1) exercising monopoly over violence in a given territory; (2) securing the territorial border and sovereignty; and (3) governing a particular population in a specific territory. The state here is theorized as a unitary actor who regulates the territory of the nation-state and the people who inhabit that territory.
Whether states in fact monopolize the use of violence over a particular territory and are able to secure their territorial sovereignty is open to debate (see also Aretxaga 2003). Counterexamples are not hard to find. The US occupation of Iraq is an obvious case, but so are UN peacekeeping missions that organize forces from various national militaries to keep “order” in politically sensitive areas or those nation-states torn apart by civil war. But could globally organized terrorist networks be included as troubling this straightforward definition of the state as well? After all, the idea that the state is responsible for maintaining security within its sovereign borders is profoundly brought into doubt by each of these examples.

The ability of states to secure their sovereignty and defend the sanctity of their borders is also challenged by border crossings of various sorts, and by transnational regimes that regulate not just states but, also, individual citizens within those states. The European Union (EU) would be a good example of one such transnational regime.

Another example is offered by the organization and operation of the transnational human rights regime which looks into violations of human rights across the globe and tries states, state leaders, and even those citizens whom particular nation-states may refuse to indict. Here is a massive machinery of surveillance and regulation, which is organized at a transnational level. It consists of activists, judges, tribunals, covenants, human rights organizations, truth commissions, witnesses and testimonies, and courts. These institutions, organizations, and individuals together operate on a plane that is of a different order than that of nation-states, that troubles states’ claims to sovereign control over their territories and citizens, and that also challenges state monopoly over the exertion of violence within their sovereign territories. The human rights regime deploys national and international means to bring to light human rights abuses by states, but it also goes beyond the frame of the nation-state and the international system of states in that its moral authority works through a transnational network of people, practices, institutions, and rules (Keck and Sikkink 1998; see also Sassen 1996; Sikkink 1993).

Human rights activists work with both transnational mechanisms of enforcement as well as with national legislative measures. For instance, US-based human rights organizations have not only lobbied international organizations like the UN to put pressure on “errant” states, but have often lobbied Congress to consider the human rights ratings of nations while making foreign policy and trade decisions. A poor human rights record can result in a demotion of a state’s favorability as a trade partner. Human rights abuses have been particularly relevant in the geopolitical and economic negotiations between the USA and China. Human rights organizations have repeatedly invoked Tibet, or Chinese prison labor, to influence US trade relationships and foreign policy with China. The use of the language of human rights as an instrument by both “state” and “non-state” actors to regulate the behavior of other nation-states illustrates how justice-based and often anti-state resistance strategies can also be appropriated as strategies of domination. It also problematizes our received notions of territoriality, state sovereignty, and the legitimate use of state violence in the context of transnational networks of governance. Moreover, it raises the thorny issue of
human rights themselves functioning as a disciplinary instrument that spreads governmental power transnationally and can potentially strengthen the hegemony of Northern states (Grewal 1998). In the current post-Cold War transnational neoliberal order, human rights instruments are an increasingly powerful means available to the marginalized for articulating their concerns and needs as rights. Yet, as Grewal has pointed out, we need to be careful about celebrating the current incarnation of the human rights regime as the solution to global inequalities – it may not be less dangerous as a form of global governance or less dependent on US hegemony than previous versions that relied solely upon international organizations like the UN (Grewal 1998:509; see also Kothari 1995; Kothari and Sethi 1991). The employment of both national and international instruments by loose transnational networks of human rights activists, NGOs, lawyers, commissions, and so on rests on and reinforces geopolitical inequalities between nation-states even as it provides a powerful means of challenging other inequalities.

Using the transnational perspective on the state allows us to disentangle the governance of a space or territory from the governance of a people. We can then ask whether different states, in the current neoliberal context, are able to equally control and regulate both territory and people. Even a cursory look at the transnational development regime, for example, shows how complicated this picture about states has become. We are witnessing how international development agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are, in effect, dictating policies to Third World nation-states. Even when these policies are not directly imposed, policy making in the Third World is overdetermined by the neoliberal context of structural adjustment, austerity measures, controlled social-sector or “welfare” spending, and market-based distributive mechanisms. How does this transnational context impinge upon and redefine the ability of states to govern what is happening within their territorial borders? The development regime also includes transnational NGOs and foundations, such as CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children and the Ford Foundation, all of which bring models of development and resources directly to specific populations without necessarily going through national governments. We need to account for their “regulatory” work and think about how transnational development discourse mitigates and reshapes the presumed ability of states to manage their own national populations and take care of their needs (Bornstein 2003).

Analytically separating the question of the governance of space and territory from the governance of populations allows us not only to move beyond the framework of the nation-state within which the study of the state has so often been confined, but also to broaden the discussion from “the state” to “governance” more generally. This is precisely where Foucault’s notion of governmentality (Foucault, Chapter 5 in this volume) is very useful. Often explained as the direction of conduct toward specific ends, which has as its objects both individuals and populations and which combines techniques of domination and discipline with technologies of self-government (Barry et al. 1996; Burchell et al. 1991; Dean 1999; Rose 1996 and Chapter 6 in this volume; see also Merry 2001), govern-
mentality enables us to unhinge rule from the “body” of the state by enlarging the space of governance. Instead of assuming that states are the supreme “holders” of power and deploy that power exclusively to dominate and rule, governmentality offers a lens to understand how power is exercised in society through varied social relations, institutions, and “bodies” that do not automatically fit under the rubric of “the state.” It enables us to see how rule is secured, sometimes in tenuous ways, through a variety of not necessarily coordinated methods and by a web of institutional and social arrangements that transcend our received understandings of the state. It helps us to move beyond conventional functionalist definitions of the state (what the state does) and to think through the dispersal of these functions across different social institutions and individuals. The state, in this frame, is but one node (although at times a “coordinating” node) in a horizontal network of institutions and individuals through which power is exercised, and not the vertically highest institution in which power inheres.

Despite appearing to explode the space in which to examine rule and governance, the concept of governmentality has itself often been caught in the framework of the nation-state (see Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Foucault grounded his analysis of governmentality in a world of European nation-states. This world, which saw the emergence of a new rationality of government grounded in the care of the population (its welfare, wealth, and security), was also one in which these European states were extensively involved in colonial conquest and rule. Yet Foucault does not invoke colonialism when delineating the logic and modalities of governmentality (see Scott 1999; Stoler 1995). When Foucault talked about the “care of the national population,” he meant only the metropolitan population of the colonial powers whose welfare and wealth emerged as key concerns of their governments. It is clear that “welfare” was not the operative term where the colonized were concerned. But the questions that need to be asked are (a) whether this shift toward governmentality delineated by Foucault in the European context was predicated upon a very different modality of power in the colonies; and (b) what are the processes and effects of neoliberal governmentalization in the post-colonial world (Appadurai 2002; Chatterjee 2004; Das and Poole 2004; Ferguson 1994; Gupta 2001; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Paley 2001; Sharma forthcoming) and in post-socialist contexts (Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Hemment 1999; Verdery 1996b; Yurchak 2002).

We thus need to think about how the analytics of government can be widened to make sense of the neoliberal world. We are living in a moment when states are doing less and less in terms of the care and welfare of their national populations. We need to analytically rethink “the state” in a context where (a) the national space is transnationally defined, and (b) many functions traditionally tied with “it” are being carried out by non-governmental organizations which do not necessarily operate within a national structure.

One way to approach these processes of transnational governance is to examine migration, to ask why people move, who moves, from where, and to where. Human migrations are not only articulated to the needs of global capitalism, they are also transforming how we think about the nation, citizenship (or belonging, more broadly), and the state (Alexander 1997; Bhattacharjee 1997, Chapter 14 in this
Diasporic movements point to how the space of the nation, or “home,” and the affective ties that bind this imagined community are expanding across the boundaries of the nation-state (Basch et al. 1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1992). For this reason, citizenship too is being imagined, practiced, and regulated transnationally and flexibly (Balibar 2003; Coutin 2003, Chapter 13 in this volume; Ong 1999). Citizenship is unevenly experienced and spatialized – both transnationally and nationally. People inhabiting different circuits of the global capitalist economy are subjected to different regimes of rights and citizenship (Ong 1999; Paley 2002).

The Indian state’s policies vis-à-vis its diaspora, especially since the early 1990s, provide an interesting illustration of how transnational neoliberal political economic processes are impacting nation-states, nationalism, national policy-making, and citizenship. From instituting the category “Non-Resident Indian” or NRI, to setting up the “People of Indian Origin” or PIO cards that enables NRIs to own property and have easy access to investment opportunities in India, to recently approving dual citizenship, the Indian government has enacted a series of measures aimed at diasporic subjects who are seen as potential economic saviors of the liberalizing Indian nation-state. In fact, these measures, along with particular investment opportunities created for diasporic subjects, went a long way toward boosting India’s sagging foreign currency reserves and bringing India out of its fiscal crisis of the early 1990s, when it nearly defaulted on its debt commitments to multilateral lending agencies (Mankekar 1999). Similarly, as Susan Coutin (2003, Chapter 13 in this volume) argues, “sending states” like El Salvador view first world citizenship regimes and diasporic subjects’ negotiations with these regimes as important parts of their national foreign policy and economic agendas.

These examples demonstrate how the nation and citizenship are being transected by global processes. We are living in a world where citizenship is transnationally administered and exercised – not only is the conduct of nationals of certain states regulated by transnational entities (in the EU, for example), but also national elections – that classic signifier of democratic citizenship and sovereign nationhood – are held under the aegis of international bodies and secured by foreign militaries in places like Iraq and the former Yugoslavia (Verdery 1998). Moreover, states in our current transnational context are not simply governing territories or the “national” populations that live within their territories, but are indeed claiming and managing populations that no longer live, or have never lived, in their territories. As the space of the nation is defined and transformed through the transnation, so is the shape and scope of the state, and of governance.

Our second example of the reconfiguration of space and institutions of governance refers back to transnational NGOs which are in the “business” of caring for populations – that is, of providing food, education, and health-related or legal resources to groups in many different parts of the world. They are expressly not tied to any national population. Instead, these NGOs link up communities across the globe not through affective “national” ties but through other “characteristics” such as poverty, or human rights abuses, and attempt to address the resource needs of these constructed communities. How can we account for the govern-
mental roles and modalities of such institutions whose spatial reach and populations served might be quite different from that of states? What does the presence of these institutions do to the legitimacy that states derive from the care of their national populations? And finally, what are the implications of the existence and work of such organizations for the relationship between state and nation on the one hand, and state and governance on the other?

Conclusion

In this Introduction we proposed that the conditions for studying the state have shifted, and that this requires new ways of thinking about the state. We argued that anthropological analyses of the state, in the current age of globalization, need to seriously contend with questions of culture and transnationalism.

The first analytic move entailed in reconceptualizing states consists of seeing them as culturally embedded and discursively constructed ensembles. Instead of viewing states as preconstituted institutions that perform given functions, we argued that they are produced through everyday practices and encounters and through public cultural representations and performances. How states are portrayed and imagined by people located in different social positions affects both scholarly and activist engagements with the state.

Focusing on everyday practices and representations as modes through which the state comes into being has important methodological implications – it opens up a vast terrain of sites and texts through which states can be anthropologically examined (see also Trouillot 2003). The articles included in this volume represent the diversity of ways in which such an examination can proceed. Thinking about how states are culturally constituted, how they are substantiated in people’s lives, and about the sociopolitical and everyday consequences of these constructions, involves moving beyond macro-level institutional analyses of “the state” to looking at social and bureaucratic practices and encounters and at public cultural texts. It requires conducting institutional ethnographies of specific state bureaucracies, inquiring into the micropolitics and daily practices of such institutions, and seeking to understand their relation to the public (elite or subaltern) that they serve. This might include, for example, following the tracks of bureaucrats in their roles as state officials and as multiply positioned citizens; attending official meetings; observing interactions between bureaucrats and citizens on the one hand, and those between bureaucrats and international agency officials on the other; sitting in on and participating in everyday public conversations about state work, corruption scandals, and specific officials; attending state rituals, ceremonies, and spectacles, such as parades, political rallies, and development project inaugurations; and following print and visual media representations of state agencies and officials. This kind of work will reveal how the boundary between the state and non-state realms is drawn, how the state is reproduced and challenged as a vertically encompassing entity (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), and how power inequalities are shaped and reinforced through statist practices, interactions, and representations.
It is not, however, enough to examine “the state” as a cultural artifact in and of itself. Rather, the current regime of globalization necessitates that we unhinge the study of the state from the frame of the nation-state. We have argued that a cultural analysis of the state must now be put into a transnational frame. What would the state look like, and what would it mean, in a world where the meaning and function of the nation-state has significantly altered? How do mechanisms of rule operate not simply within the borders of nation-states but at a scale and in a space that is of a different order? The reorganization of capital on a global scale has had important repercussions for the regulatory functions of nation-states, both because of new electronics technologies and the speed of transactions, and because the global coordination of markets and suppliers has forced a significant reduction of transaction costs in the movement of goods and commodities across the boundaries of nation-states. The current regime of neoliberal governmentality, which is spreading governmental methods across different contexts and proliferating state-like bodies that operate transnationally, is reconfiguring conventional and territorial notions of the state, of state power, and of rule. The task for contemporary anthropology, therefore, is to examine exactly what these transformations look like and entail in particular locations, and how they complicate and enhance our understandings of the workings of rule, power, and the nation-state. Indeed, if we are in the midst of a post-national order, as some contend, can we also imagine this moment of transnational governmentality holds the possibility of a post-statist order?

Overlaying the culture and transnational frames when analyzing states brings up one final issue: if we say that the state is culturally constituted, but culture itself is globalized, then what does transnational governmentality mean in cultural terms? Put differently, how can we think of the culture of transnational governmentality? Governmentality, like the state, has been generally approached as a universal idea whose structural and functional specification means that it is not located anywhere. However, different forms and techniques of governmentality have their own cultural moorings. How conduct is conducted, towards what ends, what care means, how “welfare” is perceived, and how a national population or community is defined are cultural questions that need to be interrogated.

Let us invoke the global development regime one final time, as a key example and modality of transnational governmentality, to sketch some of the issues surrounding the “culture of governmentality.” Development programs for the care of specifically defined populations such as “the poor,” “the disempowered,” or “the underdeveloped” are implemented all over the world. Despite employing a sophisticated understanding of “local” needs and the contexts in which they operate, such programs continue to be based on a set of universalized norms and hegemonic meanings of poverty, disempowerment, and tradition (see Escobar 1995; Esteva 1992; Ferguson 1994). Even though poverty may manifest itself differently in different places, and poor people in these places may have different perceptions of their situations and needs, development discourse expounds and circulates a dominant understanding of poverty (it is essentially defined by a
common set of indicators the world over, by “the lack of . . .”) and a general model for addressing it. Similarly, healthcare programs define the “problem” of health in a particular way, and encode hegemonic interpretations of what counts as “health,” what is defined as an unhealthy body, and how the “problem” of ill health needs to be addressed through “traditional” (read “culturally appropriate”) means. Even programs that attempt to account for cultural difference deploy this universalist logic. Stacy Pigg (1997) shows, for example, that programs directed at training “Traditional Medical Practitioners” or TMPs, while mindful of culturally variant ideas and practices of healthcare, are premised on the universal assumption that TMPs exist in all societies and they can be productively annexed to address local health concerns in a locally sensitive manner.

While these development programs may be based on dominant (Northern) meanings and techniques, how people in different places interpret these meanings, and how they experience these practices, are overdetermined by a variety of factors. The experiences and understandings of the “target population” as they encounter these programs, and the meaning they make of them, are also shaped by their sedimented histories and memories, their place and time. Deeply layered understandings of development, health, or “welfare,” in any one place may lead to quite divergent interactions, meaning making, and consequences. In a similar vein, globalized representations of the state in the present neoliberal context put a particular spin on how the state should be. The currently hegemonic images of good and lean government, and the “enterprise model” (Burchell 1996) of the state (that is, firm-like in its organization and behavior, following “best practices”), certainly affect both bureaucrats’ and citizens’ imaginations of the state. Yet how exactly these globalized representations meet sedimented ideas and expectations, and what specific affects they produce, are contingent on time, place, and historical memory.

The cultural outcomes of these complex interactions are not predetermined. We cannot know beforehand whether the localization of transnational neoliberal discourses will produce stable effects in reproducing hegemonic understandings of the state or not, or how it will transform the forms and institutions of governance. All one can say is that there might be some pressure or some general direction in which one might expect transnational governance to proceed. But we cannot predict the outcomes of these processes beforehand; they need to be ethnographically investigated. Analyses of such encounters and the effects they produce will also allow us to see shifts in their effects over time and across contexts.

NOTES

1 An article by Praful Bidwai coined this term provoked a vigorous discussion on the BBC News webpage (http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetoo...ws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3292619.stm). The responses ranged from people who agreed with Bidwai that call centers represented low-end jobs without a future to those who argued that such jobs were better than no employment, and that no one could find
fault with an industry that created 150,000 new jobs in five years where none would have existed for the army of educated unemployed.

2 It should be clear that we are using “North” and “South” not as geographical terms, but as geopolitical ones.


4 An exception is made for services that are not available in the USA.

5 Ironically, while separatist movements such as those in the Balkans and in Kashmir challenge the territorial sanctity of nation-states and highlight their deeply historical and at times arbitrary construction, they also rely upon the idiom of the nation-state to further their claims (see Hall 1997). While some ethnic movements for sovereign statehood are successful in reorganizing existing nation-states, they also end up reinforcing the naturalized linkages between nation-state, territory, sovereignty, and culture (for a discussion on the changing relationship between people, place, and culture in the context of globalization, see Gupta and Ferguson 1997). These movements raise the issues of who has legitimate control over which territory; they reorganize the map of the nation through contested and reconstructed definitions of ethnic/cultural/national belonging; however, they do so within the ideological frame of the nation-state, not outside it.


7 Bob Jessop (1999) connects up the (re)organization of the state with the (re)organization of the capitalist regime of accumulation. He argues that the current neoliberal post-Fordist regime has not only seen the decline of the Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS), which was crucial to the functioning of Atlantic Fordism, but is also seeing the emergence of a qualitatively new state form that is denationalized, destatized, and internationalized.

8 For a discussion of the Marxist/neo-Marxist, and Weberian/neo-Weberian approaches to the study of the state, and how these approaches engage the issue of culture, see Steinmetz 1999.

9 The systems approach, as Mitchell shows, faced the problem of dealing with an object of study – “the political system” – that was too broad and imprecise. Moreover, it theorized the “political” and the “social” as distinct orders of reality. Thus, in working around the difficulties of precisely defining the state and reifying “it,” the systems approach ended up reifying “the political” as a separate and identifiable realm.

10 Other scholars have also problematized the rigid conceptual and on-the-ground separation of state and civil society. See Borneman 1998, Chatterjee 1993, Gupta (1995, Chapter 9 in this volume), Navarro-Yashin 2002, and Trouillot 2003.

11 Making the claim that the state is culturally constructed means paying attention to the dynamic, processual, contested, and contextual notions of culture itself. Both everyday and theoretical imaginings of the state are culturally informed, context-specific, and historical. Therefore, we would expect that anthropological theories of state formation, which have been inspired by a common set of ideas about culture and statehood, take a different cast in various regions of the world. Why is it, for instance, that studies of state formation in Latin America are heavily influenced by dependency theories (see Roseberry 1989), whereas in South Asia the Subaltern Studies school (Guha and Spivak 1988) has crucially shaped scholarship on the cultural politics and discursive nature of states (Cohn 1996)? We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. While we do not develop this argument here, it might be interesting
to explore how theories about the culture of states travel and how they are synthesized in different cultural-historical settings.

The exceptions to classic Marxist conceptualizations of the relationship between the state and culture are Althusser (1971) and Gramsci (1971). Gramsci shifted Marxist perspectives on the state by recognizing that in advanced capitalist societies, the nature of revolutionary struggle needed to be altered from the classic conception of a “war of maneuver” to a tactical “war of position” fought largely in the realm of culture. Althusser’s work builds on Gramsci’s insights by highlighting the crucial role played by ideology and ideological state apparatuses in reproducing relations of production (thus also expanding the sphere of the state).

Such ideas could be tremendously important to how states function but reduce the role of “culture” to that of “ideas” (Steinmetz 1999: 18).

Julia Paley (2002) discusses the taken-for-grantedness of the meaning of the term “democracy” in typologies of regimes and states as well as in analyses that judge the success or failure of former socialist and military regimes that are “transitioning” to democracy (see also Creed 1998, Greenhouse et al. 2002, Hann 2002, and Verdery 1996a). Rather than assuming an a priori definition of democracy, contemporary anthropology’s key contribution has been to analyze the discursive nature of democracy in different contexts (for instance, how it is given meaning, what shapes it takes, and what are its effects on power relations).

See Bayart (1993) for a critique of the notion of stateless societies.


For further analysis of the deeply political and cultural nature of bureaucracy, see also Brown, Chapter 8, this volume; Ferguson 1984; Herzfeld 1992; Rose 1996.

Similarly, Bernard Cohn (1987) and Arjun Appadurai (1993b) have shown how the census worked as a key technology of rule in colonial India, through which the colonized were rendered legible and manageable, and through which they came to construct and negotiate their social identities and relations with each other and with the state.

The national program was launched in 1975. The ICDS program in any one block (a block is an administrative unit consisting of approximately 100 villages) was considered a “project,” and each project received funding independently. In Mandi subdistrict (tehsil), there were two ICDS programs.

The reason why an official might be interested in making up additional trips was to collect a travel allowance that was administered to defray the costs of travel.

A Block Development Officer is a government official who oversees the development activities of a block of approximately 100 villages.

Statistics are one of the main ways in which people study the actions of states, and states attempt to catalog their activities exhaustively through statistics. For an analysis of the historical role played by statistics in the consolidation of rule and the exercise of biopower, see Ian Hacking (1982, 1991).

Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2003) contends that anthropologists are ideally situated to study states “from below” (2003:95). Since the state has no institutional fixity but is an effect of practices and representations, and since state effects do not obtain solely in governmental or national sites, Trouillot argues for studying state effects in multiple locations in which governmental practices are enacted. He particularly emphasizes the need for examining state effects through the subjects and identities they produce.

This begs the question if, and to what extent, “Third World” states were ever able to adequately address the needs of their most marginalized populations, and the dangerous implications of the current neoliberal moment for survival of these groups and their relationships to processes of governance (see Sunder Rajan 2003).


In early 2004, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party put forward a proposal granting dual citizenship for nationals of certain “First World” states. In January 2005, the Congress party-dominated central government expanded the eligibility criteria somewhat, approving dual citizenship for Indians who had migrated after 1950. The fact that “First World” and oil-rich nations account for a major proportion of post-1950 Indian emigration means that dual citizenship is effectively targeted to nationals of wealthy countries (who have resources to invest in their “home” country).

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